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COMMENTARY

The Legal Limits of ‘Yes Means Yes’
By Paul H. Robinson

D

JANUARY 10, 2016

ebate grows over the use of "yes
means yes" as a sexual-consent
policy on college campuses. As
opposed to "no means no,"

which directs sexual initiators to halt their
Alex Williamson for The Chronicle

advances if the other person struggles or
says to stop, "yes means yes" or "affirmative
consent" states that sexual initiators have to

actually get consent from the other person before proceeding to the next step. California
and New York have recently mandated such policies, yet many people oppose them.
Carol L. McCoy, a chancery-court judge in Nashville, last summer overturned a decision
by the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga to expel a student under such a policy,
holding that it had violated due process.
On one side of the debate are those unhappy with the culture on many campuses that
seems to allow men to bully women into intercourse, putting the burden of ambiguous
situations entirely on the woman. In this culture, ambiguity is taken as a green light.
On the other side are those who see the affirmative-consent rule as a violation of the
basic principles of American criminal justice. As Nadine Strossen, a former president of
the American Civil Liberties Union, recently noted: "These affirmative-consent rules
violate rights of due process and privacy. They reverse the usual presumption of
innocence. Unless the guy can prove that his sexual partner affirmatively consented to
every single contact, he is presumed guilty of sexual misconduct."

While these two sides may seem to be in irresolvable conflict, they are not. The public
discussion about affirmative consent seems to have mixed two quite different issues.
Most criminal-law theorists would point out that there is a crucial difference between
what they would call in legal jargon an ex ante rule of conduct — that is, telling people
beforehand what the law requires of them — and an ex post principle of adjudication —
setting the rules by which a violation of the rules of conduct is to be judged.
I think there is little dispute about the value of "yes means yes" as a rule of personal
conduct understood beforehand by both parties; the only dispute is whether it is an
appropriate standard to determine liability and punishment if those rules are violated.
We ought to all agree that there is value in
colleges’ promoting "yes means yes" as
the proper means by which students deal
with one another. That announcement
and its regular public affirmation can help
change the culture. What is doing the

A criminal law that earns moral
credibility with the community is
one that has the power to
persuade people to internalize its
norms.

work here is not the occasional
disciplinary case litigated out of the public
eye, but rather the student body, men and women both, seeing that others accept the
"yes means yes" standard as proper conduct. Indeed, the unanimity that one can get in
support of "yes means yes" as a proper rule of conduct will do more toward securing the
needed cultural shift than the divisive debates now going on, which serve only to
generate opposition and confusion.
The source of disagreement — what people are objecting to — is not affirmative consent
as the announced rule of proper conduct, but rather as the rule of ex post adjudication,
that is, as the standard by which alleged violations are to be tried. One can readily
understand the fears. Opponents of affirmative consent say it impermissibly shifts the
burden of proof to the defendant.
Some people, though, are not willing to take a win by having affirmative consent
accepted as the rule of proper conduct. They insist that unless the rule is used to
determine liability and punishment, then it has no teeth.

But this tension exists in every aspect of criminal law with regard to every prohibited
offense. For example, the criminal law’s rules of conduct prohibit causing another
person’s death. Does it undercut that prohibition if we acquit someone who causes
another person’s death accidentally under circumstances in which a reasonable person
might have done the same?
Modern American criminal law has

Ambiguity is taken as a green
light in the current college
culture.

almost always chosen to require not
only proof of the harm — causing
another’s death, or having
intercourse when the partner is not in
fact affirmatively agreeing — but also

to require that there was some minimum level of culpability or blameworthiness in the
defendant.
Indeed, it is this aspect of criminal law — its commitment to imposing liability only
when there is sufficient personal blameworthiness — that has given it the moral
prescriptive power that it has. The criminal law that punishes without regard to blame
loses moral credibility with the community it governs and is discredited and ignored. A
criminal law that earns moral credibility with the community is one that has the power
to persuade people to internalize its norms.
Ironically, it is the reformers seeking to change existing norms — such as the norms of
sexual consent on college campuses — who would most benefit from a criminal law that
has earned moral credibility. It is their reform efforts that are most injured when the
law’s credibility is damaged by using affirmative consent as a standard when
determining guilt.
The most promising path to changing the culture of sexual consent on college campuses
is to adopt and regularly reaffirm "yes means yes" as the rule of proper conduct, but to
reject it as the principle of adjudication.
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